By Donasius Pathera, PhD:
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy that involves public announcement of official targets for the inflation rate over one or more years ahead and an explicit commitment to policy actions designed to achieve these targets.
It is aimed at fulfilling a number of goals; firstly, this framework is aimed at achieving price stability which is a fundamental prerequisite for high and sustained levels of output and employment.
High and variable inflation is damaging for the functioning of a market economy. It distorts the information carried by relative prices which are a key guide to efficient resource allocation and impedes the ability of the market to distinguish relative price changes from changes in the overall price level.
As inflation becomes low and stable, the mechanisms determining relative price changes operate more efficiently and it is easier to readjust the economy when there are disturbances.
This is because resources can be reallocated in response to changing market conditions and there is less uncertainty about the timing and size of relative price changes.
Step shifts in the rate of inflation can also have direct effects on the level of output and employment by distorting the decision-making of firms and households. This is particularly the case with higher levels of inflation because economic agents devote more resources to dealing with inflation, though they are less effective in such activity.
Inflation targeting has been utilized by some countries and has become a prominent monetary policy strategy. However, critics of inflation targeting have cited that other forms of monetary policy are just as effective.
A reason that so many countries have adopted inflation targeting is because of the benefits associated with it. Eichon Green, an advocate of inflation targeting, states that it brings a clear and effective method for the inflation target itself.
This is because with inflation targeting, the central bank or other assigned authority must achieve their specified inflation rate at all times.
Since interest rates are the main instrument of monetary policy, a series of interest rate changes that cause output to fall somewhat and inflation to decrease are the desired means of achieving the inflation target.
However, a central bank that is independent but has a history of inflation is likely to come under political pressure during a downturn in the economy to abandon the strategy and pursue expansionary policies to help lower unemployment.
With both the current political business cycle theory and historical evidence suggesting that this is still the nature of central banking, critics argue that central banks will be forced to revert to money growth or exchange rate targets in the event of a recession.
This is to avoid being ousted by the government for not doing enough to stimulate the economy and will lead to an abstract and confused monetary policy in attempts to return to the previous inflation rate. The cost of this will be a loss of credibility and an increase in the sacrifice ratio.
The primary criticism of an inflation target is that it serves as a constraint on the central bank’s ability to stabilise the real economy, in particular, the level of output and employment. Since the major output and employment losses associated with disinflation come from the disinflation itself rather than the inflation that preceded it, critics argue that a policy that focuses merely on the inflation rate is suboptimal.
They also argue that the output-inflation trade-off is often the only one that the central bank can exploit to fine-tune the economy.
The idea of inflation targeting is quite popular around the world because of its simplicity, a clear objective, and credibility. For Sadc countries considering the implementation of inflation targeting, several policy recommendations are critical.
Firstly, central banks’ independence is paramount. Ensuring both political and economic independence allows the central bank to operate free from undue political pressures and maintain control over its revenues and public finance responsibilities. This independence fosters credibility and facilitates the adoption of inflation targeting.
Secondly, setting a clear inflation target is essential. Establishing an explicit numerical target provides clarity to policymakers, enhances transparency, and fosters public understanding of the policy objectives. This numerical target should be set at a level consistent with the goal of price stability, avoiding both excessively high and excessively low targets.
Thirdly, effective communication and transparency are vital components of a successful inflation targeting regime. Clear communication of policy objectives and strategies helps anchor inflation expectations and reduces uncertainty in financial markets. This communication should be ongoing, providing information to the public on inflation dynamics, monetary policy decisions, and their expected effects on the economy.
Lastly, the central bank must have the necessary tools to achieve the inflation target effectively. This requires the freedom to choose appropriate policy instruments and implement monetary policy independently, without intervention that could undermine the effectiveness of inflation targeting. Additionally, the central bank should have the ability to adjust interest rates in response to changes in inflation and output levels, guided by a framework such as the Taylor Rule.
Overall, the successful implementation of inflation targeting in Sadc countries depends on a combination of central bank independence, clear inflation targets, effective communication, and the availability of appropriate policy tools.
By adhering to these principles, Sadc countries can enhance monetary policy credibility, anchor inflation expectations, and promote macroeconomic stability and growth.
