By Francis Belekanyama & Edward Kakumu:
Democracy rests on a simple promise: citizens should choose their leaders, and any suitably qualified citizen should be able to seek public office.
Across Africa, however, a harder question is becoming unavoidable: How much money does a citizen now need before democracy allows them to compete seriously for power?
The rising cost of elections is no longer just a campaign issue; it is a question of political equality.
Research from the 2025 Malawi General Election, conducted through the Cost of Politics programme, found that the average parliamentary candidate spent approximately K88.8 million, compared with K14.8 million in 2019—about a six-fold increase in nominal terms.
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Even after inflation, average campaign spending rose 78 percent in real terms. Candidates who secured more than 20 percent of the vote spent an average of roughly K166.6 million, while candidates spent an average of K30.5 million at the party nomination stage alone.
These figures show that by the time a candidate reaches the general election, substantial resources have already been spent securing a nomination, building a team and establishing visibility. The election itself is only part of the financial journey to office.
The challenge is continental.
In Nigeria, the 2026 Electoral Act raised the presidential spending ceiling from ₦5 billion to ₦10 billion, the governorship limit from ₦1 billion to ₦3 billion, the Senate limit to ₦500 million and the House of Representatives limit to ₦250 million.
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The maximum donation from an individual or entity was also increased to ₦500 million.
Across Africa, the contest for power is growing more expensive while the systems meant to regulate that money struggle to keep pace.
Campaign spending is not inherently wrong. Democracy requires resources for travel, communication, organisation and outreach.
The problem arises when the cost of entry becomes so high that capable citizens without personal wealth or powerful networks are pushed to the margins. Democracy may remain legally open while becoming economically closed.
South Africa offers a strong model of public disclosure: its political funding framework requires disclosure of qualifying donations through the Electoral Commission. Kenya has moved toward implementing long delayed campaign finance regulations ahead of the 2027 General Election. One country shows the value of institutionalised transparency; the other shows how an ambitious law remains ineffective without timely implementation.
Nigeria illustrates another problem. Detailed expenditure ceilings, contribution rules and reporting obligations have limited value if regulators cannot verify actual spending. Raising or lowering a legal ceiling does not create accountability; a limit matters only when resources can be traced and breaches carry real consequences.
Ghana highlights a different gap. Parties face financial reporting requirements, yet the direct financing of individual candidates is less comprehensively regulated. If party finances are controlled while substantial resources flow straight into candidate campaigns, the public picture remains incomplete.
Kenya’s Election Campaign Financing Act was designed to cover money, property, services and expenditure on behalf of candidates and parties.
For years, the absence of effective implementation meant a sophisticated legal framework failed to deliver the intended regulation. A strong law is not the same as a functioning system.
Malawi already has important legal foundations, including disclosure requirements for qualifying donations and recognition of in-kind contributions. Yet transparency depends on more than submission to a regulator. The key democratic question is whether the information can be meaningfully accessed and understood by the public.
Modern campaigns involve a hidden economy. Support rarely arrives only as cash. Businesspeople provide vehicles, supporters cover fuel, advertising space is given at reduced cost or free, and professional services, accommodation, digital promotion, printing and event infrastructure all carry significant value. If these resources are not consistently valued and reported, the public sees only part of the financial reality.
Malawi and Kenya can learn from each other and from the wider African experience. Kenya’s broader recognition of non-monetary contributions is a useful principle; South Africa shows the power of public visibility; Nigeria warns that limits alone are insufficient; Ghana illustrates the risk of regulating parties while leaving candidate level financing opaque.
The deeper danger is that elections become an economic competition before they become a competition of ideas. When a candidate who wins more than 20 percent of the vote spends, on average, K166.6 million, the question is no longer only whether candidates can afford politics. It is whether talented citizens without such resources can compete on equal terms.
Campaign finance reform should not aim to remove money from politics. It should prevent money from quietly becoming the entrance ticket to leadership. For Malawi and Kenya, the next reforms should prioritise clearer candidate-level disclosure, stronger treatment of non cash support, traceable campaign accounts, adequate resources for regulators and accessible public information. Regulation must also cover the entire political cycle, including costly party nominations and primaries, rather than focusing only on the formal campaign period.
The most important question is not simply how much it costs to win an election. It is whether democracy can remain genuinely competitive when the price of competing for power rises beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. That is the lesson Africa now confronts: the future of campaign finance reform is not only about controlling political money; it is about protecting the citizen’s right to compete against it.
*Honourable Francis Belekanyama is a Member of Parliament in Malawi while Edward Kakumu is the Programmes Manager for Mzalendo Trust in Keny
