By Zacchaeus Mwase:
There is something deeply revealing about the unfolding confrontation between Speaker of Parliament Sameer Suleman and the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The governing party appears increasingly uncomfortable with the very institution that is supposed to hold its government accountable.
The controversy follows Suleman’s decision to push Parliament to scrutinise a range of issues affecting Malawians, including electricity supply, Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (Escom) and Electricity Generation Company of Malawi (Egenco), National Oil Company of Malawi (Nocma), passports, the Salima-Lilongwe Water Project, pensions, the administration of justice, prisons, mining, agriculture and tobacco.
Parliament is reportedly moving towards establishing committees to investigate some of these concerns.
Shockingly, the DPP, through secretary general Peter Mukhito, has warned Suleman that parliamentary oversight must not become an “alternative centre of executive authority”. The party argues that while Parliament has a legitimate oversight role, senior DPP officials holding public office must respect President Peter Mutharika, the Executive and collective party responsibility.
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The DPP’s argument deserves consideration. Parliament should not usurp the functions of the Executive, Judiciary or institutions legally mandated to investigate particular matters. A healthy democracy requires institutional boundaries. The Executive must be allowed to govern, Parliament to legislate and oversee, and the Judiciary to adjudicate independently.
But there are equally important questions that the DPP’s position appears to overlook: What is the purpose of parliamentary oversight if it becomes politically uncomfortable for the governing party? Who exactly is Parliament supposed to oversee? Is it supposed to oversee only governments led by political parties other than the DPP? Or is parliamentary oversight expected to disappear whenever it becomes politically inconvenient for the governing party?
One would expect the Executive to welcome such scrutiny.
Instead, the Speaker is being warned about creating a “competing centre of authority”.
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This phrase deserves serious interrogation. Parliament is not a competing centre of authority. Parliament is a centre of constitutional authority. The Executive governs. Parliament legislates and exercises oversight. The Judiciary interprets the law and administers justice. That is not a political inconvenience; it is the architecture of constitutional democracy.
If Parliament asks why citizens are enduring persistent blackouts, why public services are failing, why a major water project is delayed, why there are questions surrounding public funds or why citizens cannot obtain passports efficiently, it is not necessarily trying to govern. It is doing its job.
Perhaps, this is precisely what makes the current confrontation so uncomfortable. The dangerous confusion between the party and the State.
The most troubling aspect of the DPP’s position is the apparent attempt to place Suleman’s party identity alongside, or potentially above, his constitutional responsibilities. Yes, Suleman is a DPP member. Yes, he sits on the DPP Central Executive Committee. And, yes, the DPP has every right to demand discipline from its members.
But once Suleman sits in the Speaker’s chair, his responsibilities cannot be reduced to protecting the political interests of the party that supported his elevation. This distinction is fundamental.
Political parties contest elections. Constitutional institutions survive governments. The DPP might have won the mandate to govern, but it did not win a mandate to turn Parliament into an extension of its party headquarters. This distinction matters enormously. If party discipline means that a Speaker must consult the governing party before Parliament investigates government failures, then Malawi is no longer talking about parliamentary oversight. We are talking about party control of Parliament. This would be a dangerous road to travel.
Nonetheless, Suleman should not be given a blank cheque. This does not mean that Suleman is beyond criticism. Parliamentary oversight must be serious, evidence-based and procedurally credible. Twelve joint committees investigating multiple national crises could potentially strengthen accountability, but they could also become another spectacle of hearings without consequences.
Even the Human Rights Defenders Coalition has welcomed the investigations while warning about Parliament’s capacity, expertise and the possibility of overlapping inquiries. The Speaker, therefore, has a responsibility to ensure that these committees do not become political theatres.
Malawi has seen enough parliamentary committees produce impressive reports that gather dust. What citizens need is not another parade of summoned officials, dramatic questioning and newspaper headlines. They need answers, corrective action and consequences where wrongdoing is established.
Suleman should, therefore, welcome scrutiny of Parliament itself. If he is serious about strengthening oversight, Parliament must demonstrate that it can investigate the Executive without becoming politicised, selective or sensational.
The DPP, equally, should be careful about the precedent it is setting. If a governing party publicly reprimands its Speaker whenever he scrutinises Executive performance, future Speakers may become reluctant to exercise meaningful oversight.
Parliament could gradually become a rubber stamp rather than an institution capable of holding the Executive accountable. This would be a dangerous development for Malawi’s democracy.
The real danger to President Mutharika is not Parliament. The DPP should also reconsider its strategy. If the Executive believes Suleman’s inquiries are politically motivated or outside Parliament’s mandate, it should make that case with evidence. If particular investigations fall within the jurisdiction of another institution, let the relevant institution demonstrate why.
But attacking the Speaker for asking difficult questions risks creating the opposite impression that the Executive is afraid of scrutiny. This would be politically disastrous. A confident Executive does not fear Parliament. A confident Executive opens its books, answers questions, supplies documents and allows institutions to perform their constitutional functions. If the Executive is innocent, parliamentary investigations can actually strengthen it.
Suleman’s response that he maintains direct communication with President Mutharika is politically significant but, constitutionally, it should not be necessary for the Speaker to demonstrate presidential approval before Parliament performs its oversight functions. The legitimacy of parliamentary oversight should derive from the Constitution and the mandate of Parliament, not from whether the President personally agrees with a particular inquiry.
The question before Malawi is bigger than Suleman. It is bigger than Mukhito. It is even bigger than the DPP. The question is whether Malawi’s democratic institutions are strong enough to survive the political parties that control them.
A governing party should not be threatened by parliamentary oversight. It should be strengthened by it. The DPP should remember that the President’s mandate to govern and Parliament’s mandate to scrutinise Executive are not competing mandates. They are complementary pillars of democracy.
The Speaker should also remember that parliamentary independence does not mean parliamentary impunity. The President should ensure that neither his party nor his government is perceived as demanding loyalty where the Constitution demands accountability.
The real danger is not that Parliament becomes “another Executive”. The real danger is to see a Parliament that becomes too afraid of the Executive to do its job, and when Parliament becomes afraid to ask questions, citizens eventually pay the price.
Malawi does not need a Parliament that fights the Executive for the sake of fighting. Neither does it need a Parliament that bows whenever the governing party clears its throat. What Malawi needs is a Parliament that is strong enough to ask difficult questions, an Executive branch that is confident enough to answer them and political parties that are mature enough to understand that constitutional institutions must sometimes operate independently of party interests.
The Suleman-DPP dispute should, therefore, not be reduced to a battle between personalities. It should become an opportunity for Malawi to clarify one of the most important principles of democratic governance: political parties win elections, but constitutional institutions serve the nation. The DPP won the government. It did not win the Constitution. This distinction must never be forgotten.
*Professional Expertise: Governance, Disability Inclusion, Inclusive Development, and Programme Management
